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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF 
KANAWHA AND HOCKING COAL 
AND COKE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs. -
CARBON COUNTY, a municipal cor-
poration, and CENTENNIAL DEVEL-
OPMENT COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title action. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The district court granted a summary judgment 
determining appellant to be the owner of the title to 
the surface of the property described in the complaint, 
denying appellant's claim of ownership of the coal title, 
and determining respondent Carbon County to be the 
owner of the coal title subject to a mining lease granted 
by it to respondent Centennial Development Company. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts set out in appellant's brief 
is accurate so far as it goes, but it is incomplete. Respond-
ents accordingly submit the summary which follows. 
The lands claimed in the complaint are coal lands 
situated in Carbon County. Appellant (hereafter, 
"Kanawha") was by stipulation substituted as plaintiff 
during pendency of the action (R. 24), which had been 
commenced initially by North American Coal Corpora-
tion. Kanawha's claim of title is based upon a record 
chain of deeds pre-dating the tax titles mentioned below. 
So far as concerns the surface, Kanawha's alleged own-
ership was not denied by the County or Centennial and 
the district court accordingly adjudged Kanawha to be 
the owner of the surface title (R. 56). 
The pleadings of the County and Centennial deny 
Kanawha's ownership of the coal and coal mining rights, 
and allege ownership by the County subject to a mining 
leasehold interest covering the coal title held by Centen-
nial under a mining lease granted by the County. The 
coal and coal mining rights were conveyed to the County 
by auditor's tax conveyances, one made in 1937 as to a 
portion of the property and another in 1949 as to the 
remainder. These conveyances followed upon the non-
payment by Kanawha's predecessor of the property 
taxes on the coal title, which in prior years had been 
assessed separately from the surface title (R. 7). Kana-
wha's predecessor did not redeem the tax sales of the 
coal title nor pay the separately assessed taxes on the 
coal, but has for all years continued the payments of 
the taxes on the surface title (R. 29). 
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Kanawha's answers to interrogatories state that 
there were procedural defects in the assessment and sale 
procedures underlying the auditor's conveyances of the 
coal title to the County, and make the claim that these 
would invalidate the auditor's conveyances (R. 28-29). 
For purposes of the motion for summary judgment in 
the district court, invalidity as a matter of fact and law 
was assumed (R. 38). 
The discovery materials also reflect Kanawha's 
assertion that it has maintained actual possession of the 
surface through various grazing lessees and by grants of 
surface rights of way (R. 29-30), and such surface pos-
session thus was assumed below. 
Kanawha admitted that no possessory act in rela-
tion to the coal has ever been performed by it or any 
predecessor. No mining of coal was ever conducted by 
Kanawha or its predecessors. Neither Kanawha nor its 
predecessors ever explored the coal seam by drilling or 
otherwise, nor physically entered the seam by shaft or 
drift, nor exposed it by any removal of overburden or 
other physical opening (R. 30). The record shows Kana-
wha's effort to obtain by discovery in this case the rec-
ords or logs of Centennial's exploratory drill holes, and 
the lower court's denial of such discovery on grounds 
that such confidential information would not lead to 
discovery of admissible evidence (R. 19). 
The general property taxes have been assessed as 
to the surface title separately from the coal. Since the 
times of the non-payment of the property taxes on the 
coal title which preceded the auditor's conveyances (1932 
as to part and 1944 as to the remainder), Kanawha and 
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its predecessors have paid the separately levied surface 
taxes (R. 29), but no taxes on the coal. The property 
tax on the coal, which is by law assessed by the Tax 
Commission, has not been levied by the County since 
the dates (1937 and 1949) of the auditor's conveyances 
of the coal title to the County (R. 31). Kanawha has 
never tendered payment of any of the taxes on the coal. 
Kanawha's brief recites that its predecessor severed 
the surface title from the mineral title by a deed deliv-
ered in 1932 to another, conveying the surface rights and 
reserving to itself the coal rights. That same predecessor 
was grantee of a conveyance back of the surface rights 
in 1950 (Kanawha's brief, p. 3). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD 
PLANTIFF'S CLAIM TO THE COAL TITLE TO 
BE BARRED BY LIMITATIONS. 
The district court's decision was based on Sections 
78-12-5.1 and 78-12-5.2, the statutes which prescribe the 
four-year period of limitations applicable in tax title 
litigation. Kanawha's position on this appeal is that the 
four-year statute does not apply. The reasoning is: be-
cause of the assumed invalidity of the auditor's convey-
ances, there was no severance of the coal title from the 
surface title; therefore, it is said, Kanawha's possession 
of the surface constitutes "possession" of the coal. Such 
possession, according to Kanawha's reasoning, defeats 
the application of the four-year statute. 
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The same argument was urged upon the district 
court, and was correctly rejected by that court. There 
are two basic defects in Kanawha's position: first, the 
tax title limitations statute and the passage of many 
years' time precludes the assertion that the tax title is 
invalid; second, in any event, the "no severance" argu-
ment of Kanawha is not available to it, under Utah law, 
in view of the history of the separate assessment and 
taxation of the two estates, surface and coal, and their 
actual severance by deed of Kanawha's predecessors. 
Kanawha's argument has been put forward in al-
most identical terms in prior tax title litigation arising 
under the four-year statute and this Court has explicitly 
rejected it. In Hansen v. Morris, 3 U2d 310, 283 P2d 
884 (1955), which upheld a tax title attacked by a 
presale owner, this Court stated (283 P2d, at 886): 
In holding such sections valid, we can see no 
merit in any argument to the effect that if any of 
the statutory steps necessary to perfect a tax title 
have not been taken, such as failure to give notice 
of sale, failure of the auditor to execute affidavits, 
etc., compels the conclusion that title remains in 
the record owner, hence no title passes, hence any 
claim by the county and/or its grantee by tax deed 
is invalid, hence the statute of limitations does 
not apply. The same argument could be leveled 
against other statutes of limitation where the 
authorities have validated a situation where one 
becomes the owner absolute of the property of 
another, without conveyance of any kind, but 
merely as an adjunct of the passage of time and 
the performance of statutorily prescribed condi-
tions. The same argument also could be leveled 
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against the so-called prima facie statutes which 
legitimize such shifting of unconveyed title by 
permitting certain documents to establish, prima 
facie, facts therein recited or the regularity of 
proceedings theretofore had, where such prima 
facie evidence is either not attacked or survives 
an attack, even though later it develops that 
occurrences prior to the adduction of such evi-
dence would have prevented such shifting of title 
had they been urged before such evidence was 
adduced (citations omitted). 
Since the Hansen holding, the Court's decisions have 
followed it and have applied the tax title limitations 
statute in accordance with its terms. Peterson v. Callister, 
6 U2d 359, 313 P2d 814 (1957), aff'd on reh'g, 8 U2d 
348, 334 P.2d 759; Pender v. Alix, 11 U2d 58, 354 P2d 
1066 (1960); Layton v. Holt, 22 U2d 138, 449 P2d 986 
(1969). The basic reasoning is applied in the Peterson 
case in which the Court rejected the same argument, 
stating (313 P2d, at 815): 
Likewise, title technically may not have passed 
here, but the record owner cannot assert his title 
because of the statute's interdiction against assert-
ing title or setting up defenses. 
While the Kanawha brief quotes the statutes on 
which the decision it appeals from is based, it does not 
address the statutory argument respondents made to the 
district court nor does it even mention the Utah cases 
cited below in support. There is a striking absence of 
Utah cases from Kanawha's brief. The cases it cites 
from other jurisdictions are not in point because they do 
not address the matter of the applicability of the con-
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trolling Utah statute nor take account of the governing 
Utah precedents. 
Kanawha's argument cannot succeed because its 
obvious effect would be to read the four-year statute of 
repose out of the Code. What the statute clearly says is 
that a pre-tax sale owner situated as Kanawha is situ-
ated, admittedly not in possession of the mineral rights 
and admittedly having paid no taxes on the separately 
assessed mineral rights for many years, may not as a 
plaintiff assert that the tax title to the coal is invalid. 
Moreover ,the language of Section 78-12-5.1 makes 
the resultant rule clear. It says: 
". . . [W]ith respect to actions . . . to quiet title 
. . . against the holder of a tax title to such prop-
erty, no action . . . shall be commenced . . . more 
than four years after the date of the tax deed . . . 
creating such tax title unless the person commenc-
ing . . . such action . . . has actually occupied or 
been in possession of such property within four 
years prior to the commencement . . . of such 
action." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The issue in this action is Kanawha's claim of title, not 
to the surface rights, but to the mineral rights. It is the 
mineral right which is "such property" within the mean-
ing of the statute and therefore, possession of the surface 
is not possession of "such property" the title to which 
Kanawha seeks to quiet. 
The present facts present a particularly appropriate 
case for the application of the statute. This is the case 
of a coal company which for decades has consciously 
chosen to pay no taxes on the coal title even though 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
continuing the surface payments, and which has per-
formed no possessory act in respect to the coal, which 
has made no claim of ownership of the coal title until 
suit was commenced nor any tender of the back taxes 
on the coal, and which waited until after exploration by 
another to assert a paper title. The statutory policy of 
laying stale title claims to rest applies with special force. 
Kanawha's "no severance" contention is unsound for 
further reasons, based upon the facts of the present case. 
The two titles, surface and coal, have for all years 
involved been separately assessed. Such separate assess-
ments result from provisions written into the Utah Con-
stitution (Art. XIII, §11) and statutes (Sections 59-5-3 
and 59-5-57, UCA 1953) which direct that coal rights 
be assessed by the Tax Commission rather than the more 
usual assessment of lands by local authorities. In this 
context, Kanawha's predecessor intentionally effected a 
total severance of the two titles. It deeded away the 
surface, retaining the coal title. It chose not to pay the 
coal tax. The recognition of the separation of the titles 
has been refleced in its conduct ever since. The decision 
not to pay the coal taxes was a decision consciously 
taken, as appears from the pattern of continued payment 
of all taxes on the surface. Its physical acts of possession, 
since the severance, have solely related to the surface. 
Moreover, the rule in Utah is that as to mineral 
lands, possession of the surface is not of itself possession 
of minerals. The Utah rule is in fact shown in the later 
page of the annotation cited in Kanawha's brief, Acqui-
sition of title to mines or minerals by adverse possession, 
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35 ALR 2d 124. Kanawha mentioned the generalization 
stated early in the annotation (quoted in its brief, page 
6), but stopped too soon. A later section of the annota-
tion, beginning at page 204 of 35 ALR 2d, shows the 
Utah rule to be as stated here. Two Utah cases, not 
mentioned by Kanawha, are discussed by the annotator. 
These are Utah Copper Co. v. Chandler, 45 U 85, 142 
P 1119 (1914) and Utah Copper Co. v. Eckmann, 47 U 
165, 152 P 178 (1916). These cases involved lands in 
the Bingham Canyon area which had been possessed, 
as to the surface, by persons who had moved upon the 
land, built thereon, and paid the general property taxes 
assessed as to the surface. As to the minerals, the general 
property taxes had been separately assessed to, and were 
paid by, the mining company which was the grantee of 
the patent granted by the federal government under the 
general mining laws. This Court held that title to the 
surface was owned by the surface possessors, and that 
title to the underlying minerals was owned by the mining 
company, thus holding that possession of the surface is 
not possession of the underlying minerals. The holdings 
of thes two Utah cases support the basic concept em-
bodied in the lower court's ruling. 
It follows that Kanawha's surface possession has 
nothing to do with the possession of the coal title in the 
circumstances of this case. Both in Utah law, and by 
reason of the actual facts of this case, severance took 
place. Surface possession does not affect the running of 
the four-year period of limitations prescribed by law. 
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POINT 2 
PLAINTIFF IS BARRED, NOTWITHSTANDING 
ITS ASSERTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE POSSES-
SION. 
Kanawha's second point of argument is but a re-
statement in other terms of the first point. It is said that 
Kanawha as record owner of the fee continues, pre-
sumptively, in possession of the coal title until the oppo-
site is shown. Kanawha says: "Seisin once established 
is presumed to continue until contrary is proved" (Brief 
p. 9). 
This generalization, for which support is sought in 
general language appearing in cases borrowed from 
other jurisdictions, does not apply. The matter is settled 
in Utah by our four-year statute, Section 78-12-7.1, UCA 
1953, which expressly provides the opposite of what 
Kanawha contends: 
Adverse possession—Presumption—Proviso— 
Tax title. — In every action for the recovery or 
possession of real property or to quiet title to or 
determine the owner thereof the person establish-
ing a legal title to such property shall be pre-
sumed to have been possessed thereof within the 
time required by law; and the occupation of such 
property by any other person shall be deemed to 
have been under and in subordination to the legal 
title, unless it appears that such property has been 
held and possessed adversely to such legal title 
for seven years before the commencement of such 
action. Provided, however, that if in any action 
any party shall establish prima facie evidence 
that he is the owner of any real property under 
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a tax title held by him and his predecessors for 
four years prior to the commencement of such 
action and one year after the effective date of 
this amendment he shall be presumed to be the 
owner of such property by adverse possession 
unless it appears that the owner of the legal title 
or his predecessor has actually occupied or been 
in possession of such property under such title or 
that such tax title owner and his predecessors 
have failed to pay all the taxes levied or assessed 
upon such property within such four year period. 
The statute says that the County and Centennial, 
its coal lessee, are presumed the owners in possession of 
the coal title in the present circumstances. Kanawha 
could overturn the presumption only if it had been in 
actual possession of the coal (admittedly not the fact) 
or if there were a failure by the County to pay, to itself, 
any general property tax levied on the coal title (which 
obviously Kanawha cannot show). 
In the context of the present case, the generaliza-
tions quoted in Point II of Kanawha's brief are fatal 
to its own position. Wholly apart from the tax title, the 
legal titles to the two estates, surface and coal, have 
for decades been treated separately, by all involved, in 
respect to possessory acts, conveyancing, leasing, and 
taxation. Kanawha's theory that its surface possession 
amounted also to a legally presumed continuous posses-
sion of the coal is shown to be incorrect in the passage 
from Thompson on Real Property which was partially 
quoted by Kanawha. The full paragraph (Vol. 1A, 
§165, p. 77), the first portion of which Kanawha omitted 
(see p. 9), states: 
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Where there has been a severance of owner 
ship of the surface and minerals, the surface own-
er, in order to establish a claim to the minerals 
through adverse possession, must establish posses-
sion of the mine, as such, independently of his 
possession of the surface. His possession of the 
mine must be actual, notorious, exclusive, contin-
uous and hostile for the statutory period in the 
same manner as a stranger. Actual possession is 
shown by opening and operating the mine, and 
the possession is continuous if the operation is 
carried on at such seasons as the nature of the 
work permits or the custom of the neighborhood 
requires. It is not required that the act of owner-
ship should be done every day or month or at any 
definite intervals, but they should be of such fre-
quency and character as would at all times ap-
prise the owner that his seizin is being interrupted 
and his title endangered. 
Kanawha's effort is to turn the case upside down. 
As plaintiff it cannot succeed by demanding proof that 
it has been "dispossessed." On its own record, Kanawha 
cannot prevail because the statute precludes it. 
CONCLUSION 
The four-year statute is a statute of repose. Its in-
tention is to lay tax titles to rest where the claims against 
them have become stale by the expiration of the speci-
fied period, and where as in this case the presale owner 
has had absolutely no possession during the period. 
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The lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John W. Horsley 
Joseph J. Palmer 
and 
James T. Jensen 
Attorneys for Centennial 
Development Company 
Dan C. Keller 
Attorney for Carbon County 
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